Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by Negroponte, John D & Wittenstein, Edward M
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
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Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004
John D. Negroponte* and Edward M. Wittenstein
INTRODUCTION
A terrorist organization targets America's airlines, igniting domestic panic
and finger-pointing in Washington. The plot is hatched in a distant Muslim-
majority nation-a country with which the United States has maintained a
historically volatile relationship and in which multiple attacks against U.S.
citizens originated in the past decade. A key perpetrator hails from another
country where Islamic extremism is known to thrive, and he traveled to other
countries en route to the United States, evading airport security. With the
benefit of hindsight, the plot now appears crystal clear. Prior to the incident,
multiple U.S. and foreign government agencies possessed bits and pieces of
relevant information. There was no "smoking gun" that in itself could have
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foiled the attack. But if the disparate intelligence' had been integrated properly
into a coherent picture, perhaps the terrorist attempt could have been thwarted
at an earlier stage.
The above scenario sounds eerily familiar. When framed at that level of
generality, it could just as easily describe the terrorist attacks of September ii,
2001, as it could the attempted Christmas Day airplane bombing over Detroit
on December 25, 2009. Yet the attacks also differ in critical ways, which reflect
the evolving nature of the terrorist threat and the U.S. intelligence
community's2 continued struggle to respond. A1-Qaeda launched 9/11 from the
ungoverned tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan using Saudi Arabian and
Egyptian operatives;3 an affiliated branch of al-Qaeda launched the Christmas
Day attack from the ungoverned tribal areas of Yemen using a Nigerian
operative. 4 Thankfully, for reasons reportedly involving human and technical
error, the attempted Christmas bombing did not succeed.' The Christmas Day
attempt, however, occurred more than eight years after 9/11; five years after the
Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence debacle; and after
countless commission reports, new congressional legislation, presidential
executive orders, and other directives that diagnosed and sought to prevent
such intelligence "failures" through widespread organizational, legal, policy,
and tradecraft6 reforms. These disturbing facts beg the question: Have the post-
9/11 reforms to the U.S. intelligence community accomplished anything at all?
1. While definitions vary, as used in this Essay, "intelligence" refers to "the process
by which specific types of information important to national security are
requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that
process; [and] the safeguarding of these processes and this information by
counterintelligence activities." MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM
SECRETS TO POLICY 8 (2d ed. 2002).
2. The "intelligence community" refers to the U.S. government agencies that
conduct intelligence activities. See infra note 8.
3. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 145-60, 231-41 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
4. See, e.g., Flight 253: Learning Lessons from an Averted Tragedy: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Homeland Security, inth Cong. (2OLO) (statement of Michael E.
Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center), available at http://
hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2o100127100923-82356.pdf.
5. The technical details of the attack have not been disclosed publicly, but according
to the Department of Justice, when detonated the bomb caused a fire, not an
explosion. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
Indicted for Attempted Bombing of Flight 253 on Christmas Day (Jan. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201o/January/lo-nsd-oo4.html.
6. "Tradecraft" refers to the techniques used to collect, analyze, produce, and
disseminate intelligence. Elements of tradecraft include, for example, the ways in
which an operative vets a human source for reliability and how an analyst
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At the heart of the matter lies the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),7 the landmark legislation that established the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate better the
now 17 agencies, approximately 200,000 personnel, and about $75 billion in
annual expenditures that comprise the sprawling U.S. intelligence community.'
Did the IRTPA outline a sound strategy for intelligence reform to remedy the
failures identified with respect to 9/11 and Iraq WMD? Five years later, how has
the ODNI fared in implementing this legislation and realizing the vision of an
integrated and agile intelligence community?
The answers to these questions are pertinent and pressing. Like President
George W. Bush after 9/11, President Obama has confronted an unexpected
challenge to American counterterrorism 9 and intelligence capabilities. Amid
bureaucratic sniping and partisan calls for resignations and investigations,
President Obama has acknowledged "systemic failure," demanded
accountability, and vowed corrective action.' ° The challenge now lies in
preventing another potentially catastrophic security breach without further
disrupting the ongoing work of U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, military, and
characterizes the certainty and supporting evidence underpinning an analytic
judgment.
7- Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
8. With the creation of the ODNI, there are seventeen agencies in the intelligence
community: (1) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; (2) the Central
Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (5) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (6) the National
Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of (7) the Army, (8) the Navy, (9)
the Air Force, and (io) the Marine Corps; (11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(12) the Department of Energy; (13) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State; (14) the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury; (15) the elements of the Department of Homeland
Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information; (16) the Office of
Intelligence of the Coast Guard; and (17) the Office of National Security
Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration. See 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(2006); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ODNI NEWS RELEASE No.
6-06, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENT BECOMES 16TH
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MEMBER (2006), available at http://www.odni.gov/
press-releases/printer friendly/2oo6o2i7_release-print.htm. Intelligence budget
and personnel figures are normally classified but Director of National Intelligence
Dennis Blair disclosed them in September 2009. See Walter Pincus, DNI Cites $75
Billion Intelligence Tab, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2009, at Ao7.
9. "Counterterrorism" refers to a government's political, economic, diplomatic,
military, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to neutralize terrorist threats.
Although intelligence is critical to any successful counterterrorism strategy, it is
only one element of the overall approach.
iO. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence
and Aviation Security (Jan. 7, 201O), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-inteHigence-and-aviation-security.
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homeland security personnel around the world. Evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of the U.S. intelligence community is once again a top priority.
The picture that emerges is mixed. Today's intelligence community is
composed of thousands of talented individuals who are focused intently on
countering the evolving terrorist threat, helping our military fight two wars, and
assessing the multitude of global challenges to our national security and
interests abroad. Since 9/11, numerous plots have been disrupted, countless lives
have been saved, and critical discoveries made beyond the terrorism realm have
shed light on the plans and intentions of our most reclusive adversaries. Yet the
collaboration and unity of effort so commonplace in the field has not always
translated to the corridors of Washington. The intelligence community under
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) leadership structure still is
struggling to overcome entrenched bureaucratic mindsets, enforce vague
authorities, demonstrate added value, and rapidly adapt to the diffuse threat
environment of the post-9/11 world. The demand for current intelligence on
top-priority targets overwhelms analysts and collectors, detracting from long-
term planning and efforts to think critically about future threats. And the
polarized political environment of media leaks and recriminations does not
encourage our intelligence officials to be any less turf-conscious and risk-averse.
This Essay examines how the challenges confronting the intelligence
community today stem from the peculiar circumstances under which the DNI
position was created and the inherent weaknesses in the IRTPA legislation that
have led to bureaucratic tensions ever since. We first review the intelligence
failures associated with 9/11 and Iraq WMD and describe how the political
pressures of the 2004 presidential campaign led to the establishment of a DNI
position with broad responsibilities but only vague authority. In particular, the
IRTPA legislation granted the DNI ambiguous budgetary and personnel
authorities with respect to the other intelligence community agencies,
overlapping operational authorities with the Central Intelligence Agency, and
uncertain control over terrorism analysis via the National Counterterrorism
Center.
We next turn to the challenges that we confronted in implementing the
IRTPA legislation and establishing the DNI's office. Bureaucratic inertia was
significant as we assumed a broad intelligence reform mandate with limited
initial capabilities to bring about change. Beyond the basic difficulties associated
with creating a new government agency, we sought to assert control over
skeptical elements of the intelligence community while fostering a collaborative
atmosphere. As we set about articulating a vision for intelligence reform and
developing community-wide policy directives, the vagaries in the IRTPA
legislation provided opportunities for agencies to try to limit the DNI's
authorities. All of this took place against the backdrop of an evolving terrorist
threat to the homeland and the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq. The deaths of
key al-Qaeda leaders and the disruption of the transatlantic airplane plot of
August 2006 demonstrated the intelligence community's potential to function
as a truly integrated enterprise. Yet pressing day-to-day national security
matters detracted from long-term intelligence reform issues, and key
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disagreements regarding the scope of the IRTPA legislation remained
unresolved.
We then analyze how bureaucratic disagreements over the DNI's authority
under the IRTPA continued after our time in the ODNI. Despite a variety of
bold and creative new policy initiatives, the ODNI continued to encounter
difficulty in implementing directives concerning personnel, information
sharing, and analytical standards. Congress also sought to limit the ODNI's
resources, despite the increasingly diffuse terrorist threat and the broad
intelligence reform responsibilities that Congress expected the ODNI to
maintain. When the Obama Administration inherited these problems, some
intelligence agencies sought to revive previous bureaucratic grievances
regarding the IRTPA legislation. At the same time, al-Qaeda and its affiliates
initiated another series of attacks against the U.S. homeland. Many plots
originating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area were disrupted, while
others with a nexus in Yemen were more successful, culminating in the
Christmas Day bombing attempt.
Even though the IRTPA legislation contains significant flaws, the Obama
Administration cannot turn back the clock on the intelligence reform effort.
Further reorganization (or de-organization) of the intelligence community
would be as disruptive as it would be politically infeasible. Nor can the Obama
Administration afford to overcompensate for recent intelligence failures by
concentrating counterterrorism resources on new priority countries or focusing
solely on counterterrorism at the expense of other emerging threats. The
intelligence reform debate needs to focus less on organizational turf, policies,
and plans, and more on people, relationships, and technology. Consistent
presidential and congressional leadership is essential to fostering a stable,
collaborative, and nonpoliticized atmosphere so the DNI system can work. To
this end, the intelligence community needs to be run by nonpartisan, career
professionals. Along the lines of President Obama's 2008 campaign proposal to
create a fixed term for the DNI, we recommend making the positions of
Director of National Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency ten-year nonpolitical appointments similar to the position of Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This Essay was written prior to the May 201o arrest of naturalized U.S.
citizen Faisal Shahzad for attempting to detonate a car bomb in New York's
Times Square, as well as the resignation of DNI Dennis Blair in July 2010.
Although we do not address either of these matters in great detail, we believe
that both developments are consistent with our analysis and recommendations.
President Obama's nomination of retired Lieutenant General James Clapper to
be the next DNI presents yet another opportunity to ensure that the intelligence
community is properly equipped to anticipate and respond to evolving threats.
I. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES AND PROPOSED REFORMS
President Obama has inherited an intelligence community in flux, still
reeling from the failures associated with 9/11 and Iraq WMD and adjusting to
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the large-scale organizational reforms that followed. Perhaps the intelligence
community has received an unfair portion of the public blame, given that those
crises arguably stemmed from policy failures by both the Clinton and Bush
Administrations: the failure to react more aggressively to al-Qaeda's threat
despite a succession of attacks and warnings prior to 9/11" and the decision to
invade Iraq without adequately questioning the widespread assumption that it
possessed WMD.'2 In evaluating the intelligence community's performance, we
must always be cognizant of its limits. Intelligence is not a substitute for sound
diplomatic and defense policy. Moreover, history tells us that there always will
be intelligence "failures" given the inherent unpredictability of human nature
and strategic surprise. Nonetheless, while intelligence is but one element of
national security decision-making, the errors of the recent past are worth
reconsidering in order to appreciate the challenges confronting the intelligence
community today.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(9/11 Commission) extensively documented the cultural, legal, and policy
obstacles that prevented the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other elements of the intelligence
community from possibly thwarting the 9/11 attacks. The failure to "connect the
dots" resulted in part from an inability to collect valuable intelligence on al-
Qaedal3 but also from a failure of imagination to anticipate this type of
homeland attack' 4 and a failure to share the information that did exist, both
within and between agencies.'5 This lack of coordination across the "foreign-
11. The 9/11 Commission documented the extensive interagency discussions that both
the Clinton and Bush Administrations engaged in about attacking al-Qaeda
before 9/11. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 108-45, 198-214. The 9/11
Commission also described continued frustration in the intelligence community
that White House officials in the Clinton and Bush Administrations would not
approve lethal military and intelligence action against al-Qaeda following the
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE U.S., NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION: STAFF STATEMENT No. 8
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff statements/staff
-statement_8.pdf. In reviewing these efforts, the 9/11 Commission's staff
concluded that "[b]efore 9/11 no agency did more to attack (al-Qaeda], working
day and night, than did the CIA." NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE U.S., INTELLIGENCE POLICY: STAFF STATEMENT No. 7, at lo (2004), available
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/9ui/staff statements/staff statement_7.pdf.
12. For example, former career CIA official Paul Pillar has argued that the Bush
Administration used Iraq WMD intelligence "not to inform decision-making, but
to justify a decision already made." Paul Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in
Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 15, 18; see also Madeline Albright, Bridges,
Bombs, or Bluster?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 2.
13. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 77, 90,328,358.
14. Id. at 345-47.
15. Id. at 267, 328.
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domestic divide"'6 was attributed to selfish bureaucratic rivalries, the infamous
"wall" that discouraged the FBI from collecting intelligence that could not be
used for criminal prosecutions,1 7 and "stovepipes" where certain types of
intelligence were collected within different agencies but not disseminated
further."
The 9/11 Commission attributed these failures primarily to a lack of central
leadership and management of the intelligence community. The Commission
concluded that the then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had "too many
jobs."' 9 As outlined in Executive Order 12,333 under President Reagan, the DCI
had three key responsibilities: (1) Director of the CIA; (2) principal intelligence
advisor to the President; and (3) head of the intelligence community at large.20
In reality, however, just running the CIA and briefing the President was more
than a full-time job, and the DCI's authorities over other intelligence
community elements were limited and rarely exercised. 21 The 9/11 Commission
proposed stripping the DCI of his under-utilized community management
responsibilities and transferring them to a new National Intelligence Director
with strengthened budgetary and personnel authorities. 22 To break down
stovepipes through increased information sharing, the Commission also
proposed establishing national centers that synthesized all intelligence across
agencies on key priorities, such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, and even
state actors like China.23
Although previous blue-ribbon commissions had leveled similar criticisms
against the intelligence community,2 the scale of the 9/11 tragedy, the public
nature of the ensuing inquiry, the invasion of Iraq, and the politics of the 2004
presidential election combined to make large-scale reform inevitable. While the
9/11 Commission deliberated from November 2002 to July 2004, the intelligence
community rushed to stave off congressionally mandated institutional change.
The FBI launched a new effort to strengthen its intelligence capabilities, 5 while
16. Id. at 400-02.
17. Id. at 78-80.
18. Id. at 403.
19. Id. at 409.
20. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 202-04 (1982).
21. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 409-10.
22. Id. at 411-15.
23. Id. at 403-06, 413.
24. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S INTELLIGENCE
CMTY., PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
(1996); see also IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century: Hearings
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 1o4th Cong. (1995).
25. Progress Report on the Reorganization and Refocus of the FBI: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State of the H. Comm. on
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
in January 2003 President Bush announced the creation of a Terrorist Threat
Integration Center to analyze and merge threat information from the CIA, FBI,
Department of Defense, and the newly created Department of Homeland
Security.26 The capture of key al-Qaeda operatives overseas who were
responsible for the 9/11 attacks led to the disruption of further plots and arrests
within the United States.27 Yet al-Qaeda and its affiliates remained a deadly
force, as evidenced by the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, as well as the
discoveries of other terrorist activities based in the United States.'
Meanwhile, the 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States and coalition
forces had failed to uncover evidence of WMD, which was a key element of the
Bush Administration's stated rationale for the war. As postwar violence
escalated in Iraq, and evidence mounted that the intelligence community had
erred in its prewar assessments of Iraq's WMD programs, congressional calls for
intelligence reform intensified. In February 2004, President Bush established the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). 9 This bipartisan
commission was charged with examining the intelligence community's
assessments of the WMD programs in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, as well as
Appropriations, io8th Cong. 6-7 (2003) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III,
Director of the FBI).
26. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union, (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2003-presidential
_documents&docid=pdo3feo3_txt-6.pdf.
27. Publicly available information indicates that the March 2002 capture of al-Qaeda
operative Abu Zubaydah in Pakistan led to the May 2002 arrest of al-Qaeda
operative Jose Padilla in Chicago. Padilla was accused of conspiring with al-Qaeda
to bomb apartment buildings in the United States, and he was later convicted of
providing material support to terrorism. While there is significant debate over
whether the use of so-called CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques" led to the
identification and subsequent arrest of Padilla, there is no debate that Abu
Zubaydah did in fact identify Padilla during questioning. See, e.g., Joby Warrick &
Peter Finn, Internal Rifts on Road to Torment: Interviews Offer More Nuanced Look
at Roles of CIA Contractors, Concerns of Officials During Interrogations, WASH.
POST, July 19, 2o09, at Ao; Ali Soufan, Op-Ed., My Tortured Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2009, at A27.
28. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM 2002-2005, at 13 (2005).
Although there were multiple domestic terrorist-related arrests in this period, two
high-profile ones were the so-called "Lackawanna Six," who received al-Qaeda
training in Afghanistan in the summer of 20O1 and pled guilty to providing
material support to al-Qaeda; and Iyman Faris, who cased a New York City bridge
and provided information on other targets to al-Qaeda.
29. Exec. Order No. 13,328, 3 C.F.R. 139 (2005).
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"other related threats of the 21st Century," and recommending specific forward-
looking reforms.3"
Another key moment in the intelligence reform debate was
counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke's high-profile testimony before the
9/11 Commission in March 2004 and the release of his book, which offered a
scathing critique of the Bush Administration's response to al-Qaeda both before
and after 9/1.31 Presidential candidate John Kerry then endorsed the 9/11
Commission's recommendations the same day the final report was released in
July 2004, injecting intelligence reform into the final months of the campaign
debate.32 Reading the tea leaves, the Bush Administration reversed course and
indicated its willingness to consider legislation that would implement the 9/11
Commission's recommendations. Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, and President Bush signed it into law on December
17, 20o4-just a few weeks after winning a second term.
A. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: A New and
Imperfect Law
Like most legislation, the IRTPA struck an awkward balance between the
political and substantive policy interests of affected parties. Since a political
timeline drove the legislative process, Congress passed the IRTPA while the
WMD Commission's study was still ongoing. The WMD Commission later
would note in its final report that the IRTPA "became a sort of deus ex machina
in our deliberations" and suggested that, in the absence of the legislation, "we
might have chosen a different solution."33 The debate over the IRTPA thus
focused primarily on the advantages and disadvantages of the 9/11 Commission
recommendations, which were grounded in lessons learned from the 9/11
attacks but not based on extensive analysis of the intelligence community
beyond the terrorism sphere.
In particular, the type of tactical analysis required to "connect the dots" and
track down terrorist threats is quite different from the type of strategic analysis
required to decipher the intentions of state actors and anticipate future
concerns. Tactical analysis, which was the focus of the 9/11 Commission,
30. Id.
31. Testimony of Richard A. Clarke Before the Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, lo8th Cong. (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
911/hearings/hearing8/clarkestatement.pdf; RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL
ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR (2004).
32. Philip Shenon, President Calls for a Sweeping Overhaul of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2004, at Al.
33. COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 6
(2005) [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full-wmd-report.pdf.
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necessitates a centralized focus on information-sharing coupled with an ability
to direct collection, analysis, and operations across the intelligence community.
Hence, the 9/11 Commission's proposed to establish national centers that
synthesized all intelligence across agencies on key priorities. Yet while such a
center makes sense for a tactical challenge like tracking terrorist threats, it does
not necessarily make sense for a traditional state actor challenge like Iraq or
Iran. Strategic analysis, which was the focus of the WMD Commission, is more
about the quality of the analysts themselves and necessitates a centralized focus
on language training, foreign area studies, and the tradecraft of challenging
preconceptions and communicating uncertainties. Congress likely could have
benefited from a broader evaluation of the intelligence community before
enacting sweeping organizational change.
The demand for political expediency at the expense of deliberation also
afforded elements of the intelligence community maximum opportunity to
resist legislative reforms they deemed contrary to their interests. Prior to the
passage of the IRTPA, department and agency heads spoke openly about their
desire to limit the DNI's authorities. The Defense Department did not want a
Director of National Intelligence in complete control of its National Security
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, or Defense Intelligence Agency.
4
Likewise, neither the FBI nor the CIA wanted another entity controlling its law
enforcement and intelligence operations.35 The result was a consensus piece of
legislation that created a DNI position with broad responsibilities but only
vague authorities in critical respects.
The IRTPA assigned the new DNI two of the three functions previously
performed by the DCI: principal intelligence advisor to the President and head
34. Prior to the passage of the IRTPA, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
publicly argued before Congress that consolidating these agencies outside the
Department of Defense might "place new barriers or filters between the military
Combatant Commanders and those agencies when they perform as combat
support agencies." Implications for the Department of Defense
and Military Operations of Proposals To Reorganize the United States
Intelligence Community, Hearing Before the S. Armed Services Committee, io8th
Cong. (2004), (statement of Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/document%2o22.pdf.
35. Prior to the passage of the IRTPA, FBI Director Robert Mueller testified before
Congress that the DNI "should not be directly responsible for the conduct of
[FBI] operations." FBI Views on Intelligence Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, io8th Cong. (2004) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). Former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence John McLaughlin testified that "speed and agility are not promoted
by complicated wiring diagrams" and "added layers of bureaucracy." Implications
for the Department of Defense and Military Operations of Proposals to Reorganize
the United States Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Armed Services
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of the intelligence community. 6 The Act then established the new position of
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA), who "shall report" to the
DNI 7 The IRTPA, however, stopped far short of creating a position akin to a
Secretary of Intelligence. Instead, the other fifteen agencies in the intelligence
community remained in their respective departments, reporting to the same
superiors with the added stipulation that they now were jointly accountable to
the DNI for certain functions. The DNI therefore needed to rely on vague
authorities to effectuate change. For example, the IRTPA gave the DNI
expanded appointment authority over the heads of other intelligence agencies.
Although the DNI "recommends" someone for the DCIA position, 8 the DNI's
"concurrence" was required before the President nominates an individual to fill
a vacancy in other agencies, 39 and for a few agencies only "consultation" with
the DNI was required.40 Moreover, the DNI was not granted authority to
remove the appointed individual.
The IRTPA also left many questions unanswered with respect to budget
and personnel authorities. The DNI was authorized to "develop and determine"
the National Intelligence Program budget,41 in contrast to the old DCI, who was
authorized only to "facilitate the development" of the budget .4 Yet significant
portions of the resources for Defense Department intelligence agencies reside in
different budgets, and the DNI only could "participate in the development" of
36. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. lo8-458, §
ion(a), 118 Stat. 3638.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1014(a)(2)(B).
39. Id. § 1014 (b)(2). These positions include the Director of the National Security
Agency; the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; the Director of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research; the Director of the Office of Intelligence of the
Department of Energy; the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy; the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Analysis,
Department of the Treasury; the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for
Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any successor to that position;
and the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis. In
2oo6, the Department of Energy consolidated the Office of Intelligence and Office
of Counterintelligence into the new Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
under the control of the Department of Energy's Senior Intelligence Officer. In
2005, the FBI consolidated the EAD for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence and the EAD for Intelligence into a single EAD for National
Security.
40. Id. § 1014(c)(2). These positions include the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence.
41. Id. § 1on(a).
42. National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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those other intelligence budgets with the Secretary of Defense.43 Similarly, the
DNI was authorized to transfer personnel within the intelligence community
for periods not exceeding two years but only after developing procedures for
these transfers with relevant department heads. 44 Since another provision of the
IRTPA stipulated that the President must ensure the DNI "respects and does
not abrogate the statutory responsibilities" of other departments, 4 department
heads could object and thus stall personnel transfers and other forms of DNI
intelligence community management.
The IRTPA also codified the authorities of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), which had been established by an executive order to expand
the aforementioned Terrorist Threat Integration Center.46 The NCTC was
designed to "serve as the primary organization in the United States Government
for analyzing and integrating" terrorism intelligence, and it was authorized to
disseminate that intelligence within the executive branch.47 The NCTC was
limited in its ability, however, to share terrorism intelligence with state and
local law enforcement officials and only could "support" the Departments of
Justice and Homeland Security in sharing such information. 4s Moreover, in
addition to the NCTC's information-sharing authorities, the IRTPA created a
second position of "Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment," who would be responsible for terrorism information-sharing
across the entire federal government. 49 The NCTC also was authorized to
"conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities,
integrating all instruments of national power" and could assign roles and
responsibilities to lead agencies.5 Yet strategic operational planning was a vague
and ill-defined concept, and the IRTPA further stated that the NCTC Director
"may not direct the execution of counterterrorism operations."'" To make
matters even more complex, the NCTC Director reported to the DNI on
43. In addition to the National Intelligence Program budget, the two main Defense
Department intelligence budgets are the Joint Military Intelligence Program and
the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program. Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act § loi1(a); see also WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 33, at 349 n.5.
44. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § ion(a).
45. Id. § 1018.
46. Exec. Order No. 13,354,3 C.F.R. 214 (2005).
47. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 1021.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 1O16(f).
50. Id. § 1021.
51. Id. § lO21.
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intelligence matters but directly to the President on strategic operational
planning."
Even with respect to the CIA, where the DNI arguably was given the most
authority under the IRTPA, 3 the authorities of the DNI and DCIA appeared to
overlap if not conflict. This problem was most acute regarding oversight of
foreign intelligence relationships and covert action. The IRTPA authorized the
DNI to "oversee the coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of foreign
governments."5 4 The IRTPA, however, also gave the same authorities to the
DCIA, who had identical foreign intelligence coordination authorities "under
the direction of the Director of National Intelligence."5 5 The nature of such
"direction" was not defined, and it was unclear whether direction was intended
to be at the level of operations or high-level guidance.
Furthermore, the original National Security Act of 1947 did not refer to
covert action specifically but authorized the CIA "to perform such other
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from time to time direct."56 The IRTPA used
similar language with respect to CIA authorities but added the phrase, "as the
President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct."5 7 Separately, the
DNI is authorized to "perform such other functions as the President may
direct," ' and the IRTPA mandates that the DNI "shall ensure the effective
execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities."5 9 Like most of the IRTPA, this statutory language was vague. It was
unclear whether the DNI's covert action authorities were limited to approving
budgets or extended to the conduct of operations.
52. Id. § 1021.
53. The IRTPA stated that the DCIA "shall report" to the DNI. The DCIA was the
only intelligence community head to receive this explicit stipulation. See text
accompanying note 37.
54. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § iou(a).
55. Id.
56. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 8o-235, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495. The
phrase "other functions" has traditionally been interpreted to refer to covert
action. Since then, the National Security Act has been amended to define covert
action to mean "an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended
that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly." 50 U.S.C. § 413(a), (b) (2006). These sections also outline
the procedures by which the President approves and notifies Congress of covert
action. Id. § 413(c).
57. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § iou(a) (emphasis added).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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In attempting to prevent the intelligence failures associated with 9/11, the
IRTPA also created a whole set of new questions. Amid the politically driven
rush to pass legislation, opponents of intelligence reform had succeeded in
limiting the DNI's authorities, or at least in creating sufficient legal uncertainty
for agencies to challenge these authorities over time. Contrary to what the 9/11
Commission proposed, the IRTPA granted the DNI ambiguous control over
intelligence community elements with respect to budget, personnel,
information-sharing, and operations. It remained to be seen whether a DNI
with these authorities was capable of changing how the intelligence community
collects, analyzes, and disseminates critical national security information and
whether the DNI could balance and shift resources among priority topics,
emerging threats, and longer-term concerns.
B. A More Detailed Blueprint for Reform
Although the IRTPA became law in December 2004 and thus preempted
the WMD Commission's recommendations, the Act's existence enabled the
WMD Commission to analyze the intelligence community in greater detail.
Informed by its findings on Iraq and other case studies of WMD programs and
terrorist threats, the WMD Commission sought to interpret the IRTPA and
consider how the new DNI structure might be able to function as an effective
enterprise.
In a rather blunt letter to President Bush accompanying its final report in
March 2005, the WMD Commission concluded that the intelligence
community was "dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction. ' O The Commission criticized the intelligence
community's inability to collect adequate information on Iraq's WMD
programs, which it attributed in part to uncoordinated collection strategies
across different agencies and disciplines.6' For human intelligence information
that was collected-most notably the now infamous case of "Curveball," the
discredited key source on Iraq's supposed biological weapons capabilities-
serious tradecraft and interagency coordination errors prevented critical
uncertainties from passing between collectors and analysts as well as to
policymakers.6 2 Analysts were not informed sufficiently about how key pieces of
information were collected,63 and even when they were aware, their analysis was
6o. COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF THE REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2005) [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/
pdf/transmittal letter.pdf (emphasis added).
61. WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 158-59, 166-68.
62. Id. at 8o-ini, 175-79.
63. For example, with respect to chemical weapons, analysts did not realize that the
increase in observed activity associated with "Samarra-type" trucks stemmed in
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seriously flawed.64 Though the 9/11 Commission found a lack of imagination
leading to an underestimation of the terrorist threat, the WMD Commission
found a lack of analytical rigor that led to an overestimation of Iraq's weapons
capabilities. Specifically, analysts were too wedded to their past assumptions
about Iraq's nefarious intentions and thus overlooked information that did not
conform to their preconceptions.6"
Beyond Iraq, the WMD Commission found similar flaws across the
intelligence community with respect to the WMD programs of other countries
and terrorist threats.66 The WMD Commission's description of the U.S.
counterterrorism effort post-9/i1 mirrored the 9/11 Commission's analysis in a
number of troubling respects. Although 9/11 had instilled a sense of urgency, the
FBI, CIA, and defense intelligence elements were engaged in significant turf
battles over which agency was in charge of collecting human intelligence at
home and abroad.6 7 These agencies also were engaged in a protracted struggle
with the entity now known as the NCTC over conflicting responsibilities for
terrorist threat analysis and warning.6" In addition, the WMD Commission
raised serious concerns about the extent to which the FBI and Department of
Justice had reoriented their missions to collect intelligence with the goal of
preventing as opposed to prosecuting terrorist attacks.6 9
The WMD Commission's March 2005 report recommended a number of
ways to strengthen the DNI's management of the intelligence community
within the confines of the IRTPA. Specifically, it proposed that the DNI create
"Mission Managers" to focus the intelligence community's resources on key
areas in order to bridge the gaps between analysis and collection so evident in
the Iraq WMD debacle."0 It also recommended clarifying the NCTC's rol& and
part from increased imagery collection at facilities associated with these trucks. Id.
at 125-26.
64. For example, with respect to nuclear weapons, analysts incorrectly assessed that
Iraq's procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes was for nuclear centrifuges,
when sounder technical analysis would have shown that the tubes were far more
suitable for conventional rockets. Id. at 66-73.
65. Id. at 168-75.
66. The WMD Commission's Iran and North Korea studies were classified, but the
Commission noted that the findings were incorporated into its overall
recommendations. Id. at 305. In addition, the Letter of Transmittal stated that "we
still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the
intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries." WMD COMMISSION
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, supra note 6o.
67. WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 468-71.
68. Id. at 288-94.
69. Id. at 452-56, 471-73.
70. Id. at 317-20.
71. Id. at 292-95.
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establishing a dedicated service within the FBI that would integrate intelligence,
counterintelligence, and counterterrorism functions into a strengthened
domestic capability.72 In the area of personnel authorities, the WMD
Commission described how the new DNI could break down stovepipes by
requiring intelligence community employees to work in different agencies and
familiarize themselves with interagency best practices. 7 The WMD Commission
also offered a number of detailed proposals on how to harmonize conflicting
efforts to share classified information across agencies through a combination of
standardized security clearance policies, privacy guidelines, and coordinated
investment in compatible data systems. 74
Of the WMD Commission's seventy-four recommendations, President
Bush accepted seventy, and it became partly the DNI's responsibility to manage
implementation of these far-reaching reforms.75 The nation's first DNI, of
course, was one of this Essay's authors, who was the first U.S. Ambassador to
postwar Iraq when President Bush called him back to Washington and
nominated him for the new position.76
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR REFORMS
It is difficult to describe the scope of the challenge confronting the
intelligence community in early April 2005. It was a challenge that we, the
authors of this Essay, experienced on a personal level. The nation was bogged
down in two wars. U.S. intelligence resources were stretched thin, between a
regrouping al-Qaeda along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and an evolving
Iraqi insurgency that had become increasingly affiliated with al-Qaeda. The
nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea loomed large, as did strategic
concerns regarding Russia's resurgence and China's rise. The trauma stemming
from 9/11 and the Iraq WMD fiasco had depleted intelligence community
morale. Amidst these myriad challenges, the United States had passed
legislation that mandated the largest reform of the U.S. intelligence community
since the National Security Act of 1947, the President had directed additional
72. Id. at 465-68. The Commission also proposed a similar realignment of
intelligence, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence functions at the
Department of Justice. Id. at 471-73.
73. Id. at 321-26.
74. Id. at 432-44.
75. See Press Release, The White House, Bush Administration Actions To Implement
WMD Commission Recommendations (June 29, 2005), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/o6/WMD
-Commission-Matrix-6-29-05.pdf.
76. President Bush nominated John Negroponte to be the first Director of National
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reforms based on the WMD Commission's recommendations, and the ODNI
had minimal staff in temporary office space. Where to begin?
The first task was to recruit a team of seasoned professionals from across
the national security establishment-people who understood the IRTPA and
WMD Commission recommendations and who had spent decades in the
military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. Forming a core
leadership team of deputies, lawyers, and senior staff was absolutely essential. It
was this group that helped identify additional key personnel, such as other
statutorily required positions,77 and Mission Managers to coordinate collection
and analysis on key topics, including counterterrorism, counterproliferation,
counterintelligence, Iran, and North Korea.7s
The next step was framing the mission and articulating a vision for reform.
The challenge lay in asserting control over skeptical intelligence community
agencies while fostering a collaborative atmosphere. In other words, we needed
to clarify the DNI's formal authorities but do so in a way that emphasized the
goals of integration, information-sharing, and collaboration across agencies,
not the DNI's desire to enforce a unified command structure. The ODNI staff
set out to work within the confines of the IRTPA and not rush to change the
imperfect legislation. The aim was to direct the required changes in intelligence
practices but to accomplish that goal by empowering the intelligence agencies
themselves to help lead the reform agenda.
The devil, of course, is always in the details. The ODNI was eager to forge
relationships with the heads of all the intelligence agencies and their senior
staffs, but it needed a support staff to help compile a basic list of names and
phone numbers. The ODNI strived to connect directly with the intelligence
community workforce through frequent speeches and other messages, but it
initially lacked the personnel resources to formulate these speeches, transmit
the messages, and even develop a website. The ODNI needed to assure our
foreign intelligence partners that the U.S. intelligence community was as strong
as ever, but it had no process for acquiring basic background information
before meetings with key allies. The ODNI was saddled with numerous
congressional reporting requirements mandated by the IRTPA, but it lacked the
staff to write them. Just getting off the ground in the most basic sense
demanded significant effort and time.
77. The IRTPA required the creation of a number of specific positions in the ODNI,
including a Director of Science and Technology, Inspector General, and Civil
Liberties Protection Officer. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 1O8-458, §§ lon(a), 1078, 118 Stat. 3638.
78. The WMD Commission recommended the creation of Mission Managers, which
the President endorsed. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. This guidance
was rescinded, and the roles and authorities of Mission Managers were articulated
more fully in December 2006. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE No. 9oo: MISSION MANAGEMENT (2006),
available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic-reading-room/ICD-9oo.pdf.
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The ODNI management team therefore needed to expand the size of the
overall staff in order to fulfill its broad legislative mandate. With the passage of
the IRTPA, the ODNI inherited about iooo personnel from other areas of the
intelligence community. For example, the CIA's Community Management Staff
of roughly 500 employees became part of the ODNI,79 as did the terrorism
analysts at the NCTC. However, as the 9/11 and WMD Commissions had
illustrated, these existing employees lacked the capacity to manage the
intelligence community effectively. The IRTPA had authorized the ODNI to
hire 500 additional personnel billets,s" and many of these employees were hired
during the ODNI's first two years. Critics later would charge that the ODNI
usurped existing agencies or that it represented another layer of bureaucracy
that did not provide added value. The ODNI's approximately 15oo personnel,
however, represented less than one percent of intelligence community
employees-a figure smaller than the staffs of any of the Defense Department's
regional combatant commands or the U.S. embassies in Iraq, Mexico, and the
Philippines, where one of the authors of this Essay had served as ambassador.
Furthermore, the debate over the ODNI's size pales in significance to the
critical functions of terrorism analysis, information-sharing, management of a
multibillion dollar budget, and the DNI's other vast responsibilities. When
viewed from that perspective the ODNI was neither a radical reform nor
another large government bureaucracy; though it had the inefficiencies
associated with any government office, it was designed to try to implement the
IRTPA's mandated reforms with limited authorities.
Given the DNI's role as principal intelligence advisor to the President, one
of the easiest things to influence was the quality of analysis served to the
Commander-in-Chief. The ODNI revamped the President's Daily Brief (PDB),
in terms of both process and substance. The WMD Commission had offered a
harsh critique of the PDB articles on Iraq delivered to President Bush in the
prelude to the Iraq war, as well as a general critique of how the process placed a
burdensome demand on the CIA to produce daily updates at the expense of
long-range analysis."s The ODNI changed the process to ensure multiple
intelligence agencies contributed to the PDB, which fostered collaboration,
distributed the daily production burden, and encouraged agencies not
accustomed to writing for the Oval Office to improve the quality of their
product. The ODNI also reoriented the PDB to include more strategic analysis
and occasionally augmented the briefing with "deep dives," in which top
analysts would discuss their views with President Bush. In addition, the ODNI
initiated weekly sessions on homeland threats to discuss recent terrorist activity
and the U.S. response. Lastly, the ODNI arranged for the CIA Director to join
the presidential briefing once per week in order to discuss pressing operational
79. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 1091.
80. Id. § 1O96(b)(1).
81. See WMD COMMISSION LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, supra note 60; WMD
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 181-82.
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issues. All of these meetings with the President reinforced and often drove the
DNI's intelligence reform agenda.
The next key task was delineating DNI authorities and developing the
intelligence coordination mechanisms, policies, and procedures as mandated by
the IRTPA and WMD Commission recommendations. Doing so, however,
required rolling back layers upon layers of existing directives and other
agreements that were signed under the then-DCI but now required
harmonization with the IRTPA's provisions. In the summer of 2006, the ODNI
issued its first Intelligence Community Directive to rescind outdated guidance
and outline the ODNI's overarching management, budgetary, and personnel
authorities; responsibilities for ensuring information-sharing, collection, and
analysis; and the office's basic organizational structure and responsibilities of
key officials.s2
Yet intelligence reform on paper is quite different from intelligence reform
in practice. Although we had no choice but to invest a great deal of time in
issuing various memoranda, it was the implementation of those directives that
ultimately would determine the scope and pace of intelligence reform. Time
and again, this focus on policies and plans, while necessary, resulted in an
under-emphasis on how to change the way the intelligence community actually
collects and analyzes information, which is more about people and technology
than it is about the contents of a directive. The process of developing
community-wide policy guidance provided opportunities to obtain agency buy-
in to key elements of the reform agenda, but this preference for consensus
delayed reforms and provided opportunities to challenge the DNI's authorities.
Given the 9/11 and WMD Commissions' harsh criticisms of the FBI, the
Bureau's leadership was enthusiastic to chart a new course. ODNI staff worked
closely with the FBI, Justice Department, and the White House on President
Bush's June 2005 directive to create a National Security Branch (NSB) within
the FBI.8 3 Per the WMD Commission's recommendations, the NSB fused the
FBI's intelligence, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence capabilities under
a single Executive Assistant Director with streamlined budgetary and
operational control. As outlined in the IRTPA, the DNI had concurrence in the
appointment of this individual as well as control over the NSB budget portions
82. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE No. 1: POLICY DIRECTIVE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
LEADERSHIP (2006), available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic-reading-room/
ICD_.jpdf.
83. Memorandum on Strengthening the Ability of the Department of Justice to Meet
Challenges to the Security of the Nation, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1o86 (June
28, 2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=2005presidential-documents&docid=pdo4jyostxt-lo.pdf. The National
Security Branch was initially described as a "National Security Service." The NSB
structure was formally put in place that September and the new Executive
Assistant Director was announced in October 2005. In June 2006, the FBI received
notification that Congress had approved this structure.
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funded by the National Intelligence Program. Although significant challenges
remained-particularly in terms of linking the NSB to the fifty-six Field
Intelligence Groups and over ioo Joint Terrorism Task Forces that the FBI had
established across the United States 84-the FBI seized the opportunity to move
further into the intelligence community's domain. The FBI detailed personnel
to the ODNI and its entities, participated actively in DNI-led interagency
discussions, and regularly responded to DNI tasking.
At the outset of the intelligence reform process, many believed that the
Secretary of Defense would pose the largest challenge to the DNI's authorities.
We did not find this to be the case in the early years of the ODNI. In November
2005, a Department of Defense directive strengthened the authorities of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) to serve as the Secretary of
Defense's primary representative to the DNI as well as to exercise the Secretary's
authority relative to Defense Department intelligence community elements."s
The ODNI and USDI collaborated effectively on our first major budgetary
issue: the decision to cancel funding for a portion of an expensive and poorly
managed satellite program known as the Future Imagery Architecture. 6 With
respect to information-sharing, the ODNI worked with the Defense
Department to provide secret-level classified computer access to British,
Canadian, and Australian military officials in Iraq. 7 Although implementing
this effort was a slow and often frustrating process, compounded by the security
concerns of other agencies that possessed data on the Defense Department's
network, the ultimate success of this initiative demonstrated that the ODNI and
Defense Department could forge an effective partnership.
With respect to the CIA, the DNI's overlapping authorities with the DCIA
regarding foreign intelligence relationships and covert action required
deconfliction.8 s Given all of the challenges on the ODNI's plate, however, these
issues remained largely unresolved. One of the WMD Commission's findings
84. Linking the FBI headquarters to field components has always been the FBI's
greatest challenge, and that is particularly true for the NSB. See, e.g., Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, noth Cong. (2007) (statement of Willie
T. Hulon, Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
85. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 5143.01: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) (2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/5143olp.pdf.
86. The details of this satellite program remain largely classified, but for a public
account see, for example, Philip Taubman, Death of Spy Satellite Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, at Ai.
87. This effort remains largely classified, but former CIA Director Michael Hayden
has described portions of it in David Kaplan & Kevin Whitlow, Remaking U.S.
Intelligence - Part I: Introduction, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., NOV. 3, 2006,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061103/3dni.intro.htm.
88. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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with respect to Iraq was that U.S. intelligence agencies failed to coordinate
effectively in the field, both with each other and with foreign intelligence
services.8 9 An issue of intensive discussion was whether to designate CIA Chiefs
of Station as DNI Representatives abroad in order to improve intelligence
coordination overseas. The CIA was willing to rename its Station Chiefs as
"DNI Representatives," but an outstanding question under the IRTPA was
whether these DNI Representatives could be non-CIA officials. This issue was a
bit of a tempest in a teapot, given that most CIA Station Chiefs performed
magnificently overseas, so we chose not to fight this battle in the early years of
the ODNI. Yet the issue would continue to fester and resurface years later.
As for management of covert action, here too the ODNI sought to sidestep
and thus not clarify the ambiguities under the IRTPA. We chose not to engage
in extensive bureaucratic debate over whether the DNI's authority was limited
to approving budgets for covert action or whether effective oversight required
more than mere awareness of covert activities. The ODNI and the CIA instead
settled on an informal understanding, whereby the ODNI was kept informed
regularly of covert action issues and participated with the CIA in related
discussions at the White House. Again, since this issue remained unresolved it
would resurface in subsequent years.
All too often, U.S. intelligence reform is considered the goal in itself, as
opposed to the means of achieving more concrete national security objectives.
In order to align the DNI's reform agenda more closely with desired goals, the
ODNI issued the first National Intelligence Strategy in October 2005.9' This
document was relatively novel for an intelligence community that a former
senior official described to the WMD Commission as "not so much poorly
managed as unmanaged." 9' The strategy outlined key desired outcomes, such as
counterterrorism and counterproliferation, and assigned ODNI elements to
develop implementation plans. The strategy also described the supporting
means needed to achieve these objectives, such as improved interagency
collaboration on collection and analysis, and assigned implementation plans for
these areas as well. In a directive issued in the summer of 2006, we explicitly tied
these implementation plans to the budget process, thus ensuring that
intelligence resources were directed more effectively at specific priorities.92
89. The case of "Curveball"-who was in the custody of a foreign intelligence
service-is illustrative of the need for stronger management of foreign intelligence
relationships. See WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 88-111.
90. OFFICE OF THE DIR. FOR NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: TRANSFORMATION THROUGH
INTEGRATION AND INNOVATION (2005), available at http://www.dni.gov/
publications/NISOctober2oo5.pdf.
91. WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 18.
92. OFFICE OF THE DIR. FOR NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE No. 104: BUDGETING FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS 2 (20o6), available
at http://www.dni.gov/electronic-reading-room/ICD-1o4.pdf.
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A. Overcoming Bureaucratic Obstacles
The NCTC naturally was assigned the implementation plan for
counterterrorism, which was folded into a larger interagency review that
demonstrated the Center's utility but revealed interagency resistance to the
NCTC and the ODNI. As the first real test of the NCTC's IRTPA-mandated
strategic operational planning capability, the Center managed the most
comprehensive internal review of U.S. counterterrorism strategy since 9/11.
Analysis revealed an al-Qaeda leadership structure in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border area that had been dealt a severe blow through operations led by the
United States, resulting in key commanders being captured or killed in May and
December 2005. 9' Yet the London train bombings of July 2005 demonstrated al-
Qaeda's continued lethality, particularly its ability to recruit and train Western
operatives for attacks in Europe. AI-Qaeda's violent ideology had spread in
Europe and, perhaps most importantly, in Iraq. A critical intelligence success
was the interception of a letter between core al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri and al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 94 The letter
confirmed the centrality of Iraq to al-Qaeda's overall agenda and outlined plans
to expel U.S. troops and launch additional attacks against neighboring countries
from a new terrorist hub in the Middle East.95 The letter also revealed al-Qaeda
in Iraq's commitment to fomenting chaos by inciting ethnic and religious
violence-a strategy with which core al-Qaeda expressed discomfort. 96
Nonetheless, the bombing of a venerated Shi'a mosque in Samarra, Iraq in
February 2006, initiated a series of violent sectarian reprisals that advanced al-
Qaeda in Iraq's agenda. These analytic insights formed the basis for a new
National Intelligence Estimate on global terrorism, which the ODNI published
93. In May 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the third most senior member of al-Qaeda, was
captured in Pakistan. The White House later acknowledged that he was taken into
CIA custody. In December 2005, senior al-Qaeda external operations planner
Hamza Rabia was killed in Pakistan. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:
Keeping America Safe from Attack (May 23, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/2007o523
.html.
94. See OFFICE OF THE DIR OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ODNI NEWS RELEASE NO. 2-05
(2005), http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/20051O11_release.htm (citing letter
from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (released Oct. 11, 2005)),
available at http://fas.org/irp/news/200s/ilo/letter-in-english.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id. Zawahiri expressed discomfort with Zarqawi's killing of Iraqi Shi'a, not
because they were undeserving but because many other Muslims questioned this
tactic. However, Zarqawi continued this campaign of ethno-sectarian violence in
Iraq quite effectively until his death in June 2006.
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and briefed to the President in April 2oo6. 97 That document was an insightful
piece of collaborative analysis; it effectively communicated uncertainties and
demonstrated how some analysts had internalized lessons learned from the Iraq
WMD episode.
Despite the NCTC's facilitating refined analysis of the terrorist threat, its
ability to dictate the intelligence community response was less certain. The
interagency review had uncovered continued competition and redundancy
across the intelligence community with respect to terrorism analysis. Even
though alternative and competitive analyses can foster a healthy diversity of
viewpoints, unnecessary redundancy wastes limited analytic resources.9' In
particular, analysts across agencies in the intelligence community were
conducting strategic analysis on al-Qaeda's plans and intentions in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. But the NCTC needed to ensure both
adequate coverage of key regions and a proper balance of analytic resources
focused on strategic issues, specific tactical threat streams to enable overseas
operations, and threats to the U.S. homeland. Under the DNI's direction and
consistent with IRTPA authorities, the NCTC proposed detailing a number of
terrorism analysts from across the intelligence community to the NCTC. The
Center also proposed counterterrorism "lanes in the road" that would delineate
the key areas of focus among agencies.
Other intelligence agencies initially expressed concern about detailing
analysts to the NCTC and accepting direction regarding the scope of terrorism
analysis. Citing aforementioned vagaries in the IRTPA legislation,99 these
agencies argued that the NCTC and the ODNI had exceeded their statutory
authorities. They emphasized that the IRTPA established the DNI as a
coordinator of intelligence activities, not the manager of specific intelligence
activities within agencies. They also highlighted that the Director of the NCTC
was prohibited from conducting counterterrorism operations. Yet the IRTPA
mandated that the NCTC was the primary organization in the U.S. government
for analyzing and integrating terrorism intelligence.
The arguments of other intelligence agencies were not without their merits.
These agencies had deep and storied histories. They had undertaken highly
sensitive and successful intelligence activities without DNI oversight. This
agency-centric mindset, however, was inconsistent with the vision of an
integrated intelligence community that Congress endorsed. Despite the IRTPA's
flaws, we needed to work within the IRTPA's mandates to make the DNI
structure as effective as possible. The NCTC eventually expanded the size of its
analytical cadre and sought to manage the types of terrorism analysis conducted
in different agencies.
97. OFFICE OF THE DIR OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, DECLASSIFIED KEY JUDGMENTS OF
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE "TRENDS IN GLOBAL TERRORISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES" (2006) [hereinafter DECLASSIFIED NIE].
98. See, e.g., WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 292-94.
99. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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Although it would be a mistake to read too much into the subsequent
developments, there is no doubt that the intelligence community became more
accepting of the DNI's leadership, that NCTC gained more prominence, and
that the overall counterterrorism effort became more collaborative. Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 through an innovative and coordinated
intelligence effort, putting out of business one of al-Qaeda's most lethal
terrorists in Iraq.' ° That same month, President Bush approved the NCTC's
National Implementation Plan."' The highly classified plan integrated all
elements of national power, disaggregated the terrorist threat into its multiple
facets--diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security,
and finance-and each category contained detailed operational objectives with
lead and supporting agencies assigned. The document itself was rather
unwieldy, but it represented a nearly year-long interagency process that had
forged a sense of unity among elements of the counterterrorism community.
This shared sense of purpose and (at least tacit) acceptance of the NCTC's
coordination role enabled the intelligence community to detect and disrupt al-
Qaeda's transatlantic airline plot in August 2006. It is difficult to underestimate
the significance of this attempted attack, which is often overlooked amidst
current discussions about the intelligence community's effectiveness. Very
much in line with the NCTC's ongoing analysis of the shifting threat, al-
Qaeda's core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area tapped into an
existing network of radicalized British citizens to execute their most ambitious
plot since 9/11: the simultaneous detonation of multiple passenger airplanes
bound for the United States using liquid explosives." 2 The British Secret Service
learned of the potential plot during the course of a long-term investigation, but,
when it became clear in the summer of 2006 that the target of the attack might
be the United States,"0 3 the NCTC helped lead a focused interagency effort to
assist the British and uncover additional details. The CIA, the FBI, and the
National Security Agency (NSA) were in constant, real-time communication
with their British counterparts, and we briefed the President on a daily basis.
ioo. Press Release, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, Statement by the President on the Death of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (June 8, 2006), available at http://iraq.usembassy.gov/
iraq/2oo6o6o8-bush-zarqawi.html.
loi. The details of the plan remain classified, but a slightly more detailed description is
contained in Karen DeYoung, A Fight Against Terrorism-and Disorganization,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at Aoi.
102. For an unclassified summary of available information on this attack, see NEFA
FOUND., BOJINKA II: THE TRANSATLANTIC LIQUID BOMB PLOT (2008), available at
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Bojinka2LiquidBom
bs.pdf.
103. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, Remarks by Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff, United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, FBI
Director Robert Mueller, and Assistant Secretary for TSA Kip Hawley (Aug. lo,
20o6), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1158349691914.shtm.
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As evidence emerged of a highly sophisticated, nascent attack on
transatlantic airlines, the NCTC and the White House Homeland Security
Council held regular meetings (often virtual videoconferences) to discuss our
evolving knowledge of the plot. The NCTC worked with the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security on the domestic dimensions of the plot,
including any ties the suspects had to the United States and what transportation
security measures to implement. The NCTC also worked with the CIA and the
NSA on foreign dimensions, particularly as it became clear that the plotters
received logistical and financial support from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.
The resulting British and Pakistani arrests exemplified interagency coordination
at its best-the type of integrated intelligence community the IRTPA sought to
create.
The intelligence community's understanding of the evolving terrorist threat
also influenced heavily the Bush Administration's decision to surge troops into
Iraq in January 2007. The April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Trends
in Global Terrorism noted how the Iraqi insurgency had morphed into a "cause
clbre" for jihadists, "shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives."' °4 Reports from intelligence community elements in Iraq painted a
bleak picture of escalating sectarian violence bordering on civil war. The ODNI
and the CIA both communicated these views to the President, which helped
initiate a wide-ranging interagency review of U.S. strategy in Iraq beginning in
the fall of 2006. As part of this review, the intelligence community provided
regular analysis to the National Security Council regarding the changing nature
of the insurgency, the ability to train Iraqi army and police officers, and the
likelihood of the Iraqi government achieving political reconciliation at the
national level. These analyses formed the basis of the January 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq-an important piece of analysis that framed the
Iraq challenge extremely well." 5 President Bush's decision to implement the
"surge" in Iraq and the subsequent improvements in security can be attributed
in part to the sound intelligence analysis that underpinned the strategic
decision.
At the beginning of 2007, the intelligence community's progress very much
remained a mixed picture, with signs of promise but just as many outstanding
questions. The ODNI had set up its own office and initiated the most basic
structural reforms in accordance with the IRTPA and WMD Commission
recommendations, but the actual effects of these reforms-such as the FBI's
National Security Branch-remained to be seen. The ODNI had issued new
policy guidance on coordinated collection, analytic standards, and personnel
policies, but these initiatives had yet to progress much beyond their initial
stages. Structural and policy changes lay an important foundation for reform,
104. DECLASSIFIED NIE, supra note 97, at 2.
105. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ'S STABILITY: A
CHALLENGING ROAD AHEAD (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/
press-releases/20070202_release.pdf.
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but they had not achieved any sort of enduring cultural change beyond strong
personal relationships among key intelligence officials.
The NCTC had demonstrated its ability to help the intelligence community
adapt to the evolving terrorist threat relating to Europe and Iraq. The Center
facilitated information-sharing, helped disrupt a key attempted attack, and
developed a new interagency plan for action. Yet it was not clear at that time
whether the NCTC would be able to implement its strategy, direct further
changes to the counterterrorism community, and just as easily anticipate and
respond to future threats. Although the quality of intelligence analysis had
improved greatly through a strengthened National Intelligence Estimate and
President's Daily Brief process, here too the improved product stemmed more
from the personal efforts of senior analysts than from fundamental changes in
how many analysts performed their work.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment was the lack of attention devoted to
other important intelligence reform issues, given pressing day-to-day national
security matters. Key challenges loomed large on the horizon, such as bringing
the Defense Department intelligence agencies further into the DNI structure,
implementing personnel and information sharing directives, and clearing up
continued issues with the CIA regarding overlapping authorities. Meanwhile,
Congress had begun to escalate its attacks on the ODNI and called for a
reduction in its budget and personnel.
B. Further Reforms and Lingering Challenges
With our departure from the ODNI and move to the State Department in
early 2007, the new DNI, retired Vice Admiral Mike McConnell, had an
excellent opportunity to reenergize the intelligence reform effort. He issued an
ambitious "ioo Day Plan" to accelerate reform in a number of key areas,
including information-sharing and relations with the Department of Defense."'
The ODNI undertook a number of key reforms to synchronize its
relationship more closely with the Department of Defense. First, as part of an
office-wide reorganization, the DNI "dual-hatted" the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence as a new Deputy DNI for Defense Intelligence. °7
Though this step may have appeared largely symbolic, it helped streamline the
relationship between the DNI and the Secretary of Defense. The ODNI took
steps to clarify its budgetary acquisition authorities with the Defense
Department, creating a new Deputy DNI for Acquisition and issuing revised
106. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY (IC) 100 DAY PLAN FOR INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION (2007),
available at http://www.dni.gov/ioo-day-plan/ioo-day-plan.pdf.
107. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, ODNI NEWS RELEASE No. 16-07,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE To BE DUAL-HATTED AS
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policy guidance to streamline the process."" In addition, the ODNI
strengthened the so-called "joint duty" program, issuing revised guidance to
require intelligence community employees to undertake an assignment outside
their "home" agency before being promoted to the next level.'0 9 Despite these
best efforts, however, the ODNI was still limited by the ambiguous IRTPA
legislation. In February 2008, before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, the DNI lamented:
[A]s a practical matter, I'm in a situation where it's someone in a
department with a different set of personnel standards and a different
set of hiring and firing policies and so on. So it's not that I can give
direct orders to someone else's organization. There's a cabinet secretary
between me and the process."0
The DNI also devoted much-needed attention but continued to encounter
obstacles with respect to information-sharing policies. In October 2007,
President Bush issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing."' The
Strategy codified the goals of an ongoing multi-year effort to improve the flow
of terrorist and other critical intelligence information within the federal
government, as well as with state, local, and tribal governments, the private
sector, and foreign partners. Yet the strategy also reflected the fact that disparate
sharing efforts within the intelligence community and across the federal
government still remained loosely coordinated. The NCTC, the FBI, and the
Department of Homeland Security continued to disagree over responsibilities
for sharing threat information with state and local officials."' Security
classification and clearances remained the most serious impediments to sharing,
108. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY
GUIDANCE No. 801.1: ACQUISITION (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/
electronic-reading-room/ICPG_8olil.pdf.
109. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY
GUIDANCE No. 601.1: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CIVILIAN JOINT DUTY
IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic
_readingroom/ICPG_6oi1.pdf. This policy guidance built upon an earlier
directive. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE No. 6ol, HUMAN CAPITAL JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (2006), available at http://www.dni.gov/
electronic-reading-room/ICD_6o1.pdf.
110. Statutory Authorities of the Director of National Intelligence: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, noth Cong. (2008).
III. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Information
Sharing (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2007/1o/20071031-1o.html.
112. See Mike Levine, White House Wades into Terror Intel Dispute Between FBI,
Homeland Security, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2oo9/12/16/white-house-intervenes-dispute-fbi-homeland-security/;
supra text accompanying note 48.
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and the ODNI took steps to standardize these rules with respect to information
about U.S. persons,1 3 certification of information technology systems," 4 and
access to sensitive compartmented information."5 Given the desire to share
threat information widely since 9/11, however, the biggest problem facing the
intelligence community had become the problem of too much information, not
too little. Analysts now struggled to sort through large amounts of data to
determine their significance, and the "data-mining" technology to do this was
not well-developed.
With respect to analysis, the ODNI also issued further guidelines in June
2007 to ensure that analytic products met rigorous tradecraft expectations
across the intelligence community." 6 As evidence that policy documents alone
do not alleviate tradecraft errors, however, the DNI's own National Intelligence
Council issued a new estimate on Iran's nuclear program in December 2007 to
widespread criticism." 7 The estimate made a major public splash with its "high
confidence" judgment that, "in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear
weapons program.""' In a footnote reminiscent of those voicing interagency
disagreement in the infamous Iraq WMD estimate, the Iran estimate defined
"nuclear weapons program" to exclude "Iran's declared civil work related to
uranium enrichment" and its missile delivery systems."9 Prominent experts
objected to this narrow definition of "nuclear weapons program," given that
many analysts believed Iran to be developing a so-called "break-out capability,"
113. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE No. 1O2: PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES AND
PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
COLLECTION, RETENTION, AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING
U.S. PERSONS (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic-reading
_room/ICD_102.pdf.
114. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE No. 5o3: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SYSTEMS SECURITY: RISK MANAGEMENT, CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
(20o8), available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic reading_room/ICD_503.pdf.
115. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE No. 704: PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION AND OTHER CONTROLLED ACCESS PROGRAM INFORMATION (2008),
available at http://www.dni.gov/electronic reading-room/ICD_7o4.pdf.
116. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
DIRECTIVE NO. 203: ANALYTIC STANDARDS (2007), available at
http://www.odni.gov/electronic-reading-room/ICD_203.pdf.
117. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES (2007), available at
http://www.odni.gov/press_releases/200712o3release.pdf.
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through which the civilian nuclear and missile programs progress to a point just
shy of weaponization, allowing the country to build a bomb quickly.2 ° Still
others claimed that analysts had politicized the estimate by hyping intelligence
that appeared to diminish the Iranian threat, thereby limiting the Bush
Administration's ability to take military action against Iran.'21 Testifying before
Congress that same month, the DNI acknowledged that in retrospect he
I(probably would have changed a thing or two" about the phrasing of the
unclassified key judgment."' The Obama Administration's February 2009
revelation that Iran had in fact been conducting undeclared uranium
enrichment activities provided further evidence that the 2007 estimate had
failed to communicate requisite uncertainty. 
2 3
Building upon the National Intelligence Strategy of 2005, the DNI further
formalized the intelligence community's strategic planning process, issuing a
status report at the end of ioo days as well as an ambitious "50o Day Plan" to
guide the reform effort to the end of the Bush Administration. 2 4 Again,
however, the DNI encountered obstacles, not just from agencies resistant to
reform, but also from Congress, which attempted to limit the DNI's resources.
Since the passage of the IRTPA, there has been significant tension between the
ODNI and congressional oversight committees, most notably the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Congress has questioned the
growing size of the DNI's office and whether the organization creates added
120. See, e.g., Leonard S. Spector, James Martin Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies,
Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of
Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate (Dec. 6, 2007), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/o712o6.htm.
121. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Op-Ed., The Flaws in the Iran Report, WASH. POST, Dec.
6, 2007, at A29; Henry Kissinger, Op-Ed., Misreading the Iran Report, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
-dyn/contentarticle/2007/12/12/AR2oo71212o2331.html.
122. Current and Projected Threats to the National Security: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, noth Cong. 77 (2008) (statement by Michael McConnell,
Director of National Intelligence).
123. Press Release, White House, Statements by President Obama, French President
Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister Brown on Iranian Nuclear Facility (Sept. 25,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Statements-By
-President-Obama-French-President-Sarkozy-And-British-Prime-Minister-
Brown-On-Iranian-Nuclear-Facility/.
124. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY (IC) 1OO DAY PLAN FOR INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION:
FOLLOW-UP REPORT (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/ioo-day
-plan/looFOLLOW UP REPORT.pdf; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L
INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) 500 DAY PLAN:
INTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/5oo-
day-plan.pdf.
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value in the intelligence community. " ' Somewhat hypocritically, Congress has
disparaged successive DNIs both for having too many staff members and for
not asserting a more direct managerial role over intelligence community
functions. '26 In response, ODNI officials have emphasized the need for
sufficient personnel to assume the management role desired by Congress and to
focus on long-term challenges in addition to daily tactical requirements. As
previously mentioned, the approximately 1500 employees in the ODNI is a
small size compared to the vast responsibilities mandated by the IRTPA and the
overall size of the intelligence community.
Congress leveled these criticisms against the ODNI as the al-Qaeda threat
became more diffuse, requiring greater resources on the part of the NCTC. By
2008, al-Qaeda had begun to rejuvenate along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
area due in part to failed Pakistani efforts to negotiate a truce with militants in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. As Iraq began to stabilize somewhat
due to the increased U.S. military presence, the intelligence community also
surged to support expanded counterterrorism operations in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border regions. Yet the more al-Qaeda's central leadership faced
pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the more it sought to reestablish ties and
leverage regional extremists in other ungoverned areas, including Yemen, North
Africa, and East Africa. This ever-shifting terrorist threat was difficult to track
with finite analytic resources and limited NCTC authority to reduce
unnecessary redundancy across the intelligence community in order to achieve
full coverage of all threats.
In the last year of the Bush Administration, the ODNI wisely sought to
codify its existing authorities and responsibilities through an executive order.
Despite the IRTPA's provisions, the intelligence community still technically was
governed by a Reagan-era executive order that did not even mention the DNI's
existence. 127 A revision of that order potentially could clarify the DNI's
authorities, but it also threatened to unleash the same interagency
disagreements. What ensued was a spirited year-long debate among intelligence
community elements under the direction of the National Security Council,
which culminated in a new executive order issued in July 20o8.12'8 The new order
reiterated many of the DNI's IRTPA authorities but strengthened them in other
key respects. First, the executive order went beyond the IRTPA in granting the
DNI a voice in the removal of other intelligence community heads, as opposed
to only concurrence in their appointments. 2 9 Second, the order helped clarify
125. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-411 (2006).
126. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 110-131 (20o6); Walter Pincus, Intelligence Director Urged
To Take Charge, WASH. POST, May 11, 2007, at Ao4.
127. See supra note 2o and accompanying text.
128. Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009) [hereinafter E.O. 13,470].
129. For the DCIA, the DNI may recommend removal to the President. For other
heads of intelligence elements, the DNI and the relevant department head must
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overlapping authorities with the CIA by stating that the DNI "shall align and
synchronize intelligence and counterintelligence foreign relationships."13 ° The
order also iterated that the DNI "shall oversee and provide advice to the
President and the NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action
programs."13' Finally, although the executive order reiterated the problematic
IRTPA language that the DNI shall not "abrogate the statutory responsibilities"
of department heads and the DCIA,'32 the document provided a streamlined
review process for quickly appealing departmental objections to the President. 33
These reforms were important and helped solidify the DNI's leadership within
the intelligence community, at least on paper.
Nevertheless, the executive order still left key questions unanswered
regarding the ODNI's relationship with the CIA and the NCTC's authority over
other elements of the intelligence community. For example, although the order
clarified the DNI's authorities over foreign intelligence relationships, it did not
address the issue of whether DNI Representatives overseas could be officials
other than the CIA Chiefs of Station. Moreover, while the order clarified the
DNI's covert action oversight authorities, it did not specify whether oversight
required detailed insight and approval of specific operations. Furthermore, even
though the DNI was authorized to "manage and direct the tasking, collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination" of intelligence across the
community,3 4 it was not clear whether the NCTC had such explicit authority.
III. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S TROUBLING INHERITANCE
Unlike in 2004, intelligence reform did not factor heavily in the 2008
presidential campaign. President Obama and most of his top aides therefore
had minimal exposure to the matter before assuming office. While President
Obama retained a number of key officials in leadership positions throughout
the intelligence community,35 he replaced two of the most seasoned intelligence
consult on removal and, if the position requires presidential appointment, may
recommend removal to the President. E.O. 13,470 § 2(1.3)(e).
130. Id. § 2(.3)(b)(4)(C).
131. Id. § 2(1.3)(b)(3).
132. See supra note 45.
133. E.O. 13,470 § 2(1.3)(c). Of note, by specifying that the appeals process applied to
"any department head whose department contains an element of the Intelligence
Community," the order appeared to exclude the CIA-which is an agency, not a
department-from having appeals rights similar to full-fledged departments.
Notwithstanding this stipulation, however, the CIA apparently still appealed to
the White House regarding the ODNI's subsequent efforts to appoint the senior
intelligence community official in each country overseas. See infra note 141.
134. E.O. 13,470 § 2(1.3)(b)(17).
135. Most notably the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Deputy Director
of CIA, and the Director of the NCTC.
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professionals in the business, DNI Mike McConnell and DCIA Mike Hayden.
This decision was perplexing given one of the incoming White House's only
intelligence-related policy proposals during the campaign, best articulated in
the "Blueprint for Change" document of February 2008:
Getting Politics out of Intelligence. Obama and Biden will insulate the
Director of National Intelligence from political pressure by giving the
DNI a fixed term, like the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Obama
and Biden will seek consistency and integrity at the top of our
intelligence community - not just a political ally.136
Although it received minimal coverage on the campaign trail, this
important proposal could have been advanced by retaining the DNI and
DCIA-both career intelligence officers-during the political transition.
Moreover, the 9/11 Commission documented how the turnover in national
security personnel during the transition between the Clinton and Bush
Administrations contributed to the lack of decisive action against al-Qaeda
prior to 9/11.137 For the Obama Administration, leadership continuity could
have been helpful in terms of fostering stability in an intelligence community
that has been saddled with scandals, investigations, and reorganizations for
most of the past decade. The first year of the Obama Administration saw
revived disagreements among the ODNI, Congress, and other intelligence
community elements and an evolving al-Qaeda threat to the homeland that
culminated in the attempted Christmas Day bombing in 2009.
In June 2009, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 passed the House
Intelligence Committee.' Although the details of the intelligence budget are
classified, NCTC Director Michael Leiter subsequently has confirmed that the
bill included deep staffing cuts to the ODNI and the NCTC.13 9 The bill was not
considered on the House floor, but reportedly there were discussions about
how the NCTC would absorb cuts of up to twenty percent in certain mission
areas, including the watch-listing personnel that would come under much
scrutiny following the Christmas Day bombing attempt. 4 These potential
personnel cuts reflected the ODNI's ongoing dispute with Congress over the
office's size and mandate. Time will tell whether the attempted Christmas
bombing may have vindicated the ODNI's position.
These recurring resource disagreements with Congress occurred against the
backdrop of reported disagreements between the new DNI Dennis Blair and
136. BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN'S PLAN FOR AMERICA 74 (2oo8),
available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/ObamaBlueprintForChange.pdf.
137. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 198-214.
138. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, H.R. 27ol, ulth Cong. (2009).
139. Flight 253: Learning Lessons from an Averted Tragedy: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Homeland Security, i1th Cong. (Jan. 27, 2010) (statement of Michael E. Leiter,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
140. Id.
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DCIA Leon Panetta over their respective authorities regarding foreign
intelligence relationships and management of covert action. Although the
details remain classified, it appears that both the ODNI and the CIA viewed the
transition to a new administration as an opportunity to revive bureaucratic
grievances: for the ODNI, an opportunity to assert clear direction over covert
action and the appointment of DNI Representatives abroad; and for the CIA, an
opportunity to resist DNI authority and reestablish its operational
independence and direct line to the White House. Press reports indicate that in
May 2009 the ODNI sought to exert its authority under the IRTPA and
Executive Order 13,470 to appoint the senior intelligence community official in
each country overseas and to establish a clearer management role over covert
action and other sensitive intelligence operations. The CIA resisted, likely citing
the aforementioned lack of legal clarity on both issues, and brought the matter
to the White House.14' According to press accounts, and perhaps unsurprisingly,
the dispute festered for more than six months, despite the personal
interventions of the National Security Advisor and the Vice President. 142 As
reported in December 2009, the National Security Advisor issued a memo
clarifying that CIA Chiefs of Station would serve as DNI Representatives abroad
and that the CIA would maintain a direct line of communication to the White
House on covert action while keeping the DNI informed.143 Though there is no
evidence that this dispute hindered any intelligence-sharing or operations, the
outcome appeared to limit the DNI's authority, and, at the very least, it wasted
time and resources that could have been spent on other reform efforts. The
WMD Commission had warned in the letter to President Bush accompanying
its final report that: "Sooner or later, [other intelligence agencies] will try to run
around-or over-the DNI. Then, only [the President's] determined backing
will convince them that we cannot return to the old ways."' 44
By ruling in favor of the sub-Cabinet level DCIA, the White House dealt a
political setback to the Cabinet-level DNI and the intelligence reform effort in
general. As the DNI-CIA dispute continued, so too did al-Qaeda's
decentralization and expansion beyond the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.
141. Mark Mazetti, Turf Battles on Intelligence Post Test for Spy Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES.COM,
June 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/o6/o9/us/politics/o9intel.html.
Moreover, that the CIA was able to appeal an ODNI policy to the White House at
all seemed to undermine the DNI's authorities under Executive Order 13,470 §
2(1.3)(c). The appeals process in the order arguably excluded the CIA-which is
an agency, not a department-from having appeals rights similar to full-fledged
departments. See supra note 133.
142. Posting of Mark Hosenball to Declassified, http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/
declassified/archive/20o9/lo/19/even-biden-can-t-resolve-endless-spy-squabble
.aspx (Oct. 19, 2009, 11:oo EDT).
143. Greg Miller, A White House Intervention for Bickering Leaders of U.S. Intelligence,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2oo9/dec/29/
nation/la-na-cia-dispute29-20o9dec29.
144. WMD COMMISSION LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, supra note 60.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
President Obama reportedly has continued-and even expanded-the Bush
Administration's policy of robust counterterrorism operations in Pakistan,
dealing a series of lethal blows to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates. 14 To
compensate for these setbacks, the al-Qaeda leadership increasingly has relied
on its ideology and relations with regional extremist groups to inspire rather
than direct specific terrorist attacks. Even though al-Qaeda likely continues to
plan spectacular attacks on the scale of 9/11 and the 2006 transatlantic airline
plot, its affiliates also appear to have encouraged smaller-scale attacks within the
United States that still sow fear and attract publicity. This assessment is not
based on any classified information, but rather on our understanding of a new
wave of terrorist attacks directed at the homeland beginning in the summer of
2009.
In June 2009, a male citizen of Memphis who now claims ties to al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-the regional al-Qaeda off-shoot based in
Yemen-allegedly shot two soldiers outside a military recruiting station in
Arkansas146 In September 2009, the FBI arrested legal Denver resident
Najibullah Zazi for an alleged al-Qaeda plot to bomb New York City.14 7 These
captures led to a series of other arrests and allegedly uncovered an al-Qaeda
support network in the United States.' 48 The Zazi arrest likely factored into
President Obama's decision to visit the NCTC in October, thank the Center for
its hard work and dedication, and urge it to remain vigilant in the face of
evolving threats.1 49 Later that month, federal authorities in Chicago disclosed
arrests and unsealed complaints against Chicago-based U.S. citizen David
Headley and associates, accusing them of supporting a Pakistani militant group
in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India and aiding the murder
of U.S. citizens. 5 ' In November, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at
the Fort Hood military base in Texas, killing thirteen people. Hasan allegedly
145. See, e.g., Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in
Pakistan, 2004-2010, LONG WAR J. (2OO), http://www.longwarjournal.org/
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148. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Three Arrested in Ongoing Terror
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communicated with a radical cleric in Yemen associated with AQAP prior to
the shooting.''
In a December 2009 op-ed in the Washington Post, DNI Blair praised the
Zazi and Headley arrests as evidence of a "new level of cooperation among FBI,
local law enforcement, and U.S. intelligence agencies."'5 2 He continued:
In both cases, tips and leads were smoothly passed among those
gathering information in this country and those gathering information
overseas, including foreign intelligence services that provided
information or responded to questions. These investigations connected
the dots in exactly the ways the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act envisioned. However, as the case of Army Maj. Nidal
Hasan .. .shows, we must go even further in our efforts to turn
intelligence into the knowledge needed to protect Americans."
The attempted Christmas Day bombing occurred exactly one week later.
Obama Administration officials have since acknowledged that, in hindsight, the
intelligence community possessed bits and pieces of relevant information about
the Yemen-based Nigerian operative, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, which
should have prevented him from boarding the Northwest Airlines flight bound
for Detroit. 15 4 This attack is the third on the homeland since the summer of
2009 with ties to AQAP, a fact demonstrating the increasing importance of
Yemen as an al-Qaeda external operations hub.
It is tempting to view the Christmas Day bombing plot as symptomatic of
larger problems plaguing the intelligence community since 2004: ODNI and
NCTC struggles to assert control over the intelligence community while
adapting to evolving threats; Congress's desire to limit ODNI and NCTC
resources, even while holding it accountable for terrorist attacks; and
information overload, by which agencies now share endless volumes of threat
information and increase the difficulty of distinguishing real from mundane
threats. Obama Administration officials have harped on all these issues during
recent congressional testimony,5 ' and the President has vowed an aggressive
response. In his January 2010 memo on corrective actions to the heads of key
departments and intelligence agencies, President Obama directed the DNI to
"[i]mmediately reaffirm and clarify roles and responsibilities of the
counterterrorism analytic components of the Intelligence Community" and
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"accelerate information technology enhancements" to sort more efficiently
through growing terrorism databases. 6 He also directed the NCTC to
"establish and resource appropriately a process to prioritize and pursue
thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism threat leads, to include the identification
of appropriate follow-up action."'5 7
NCTC Director Leiter has testified that he plans to field new analytical
pursuit teams that will run specific threats to ground but that the NCTC "does
not have enough analysts to comb through the thousands of terrorism-related
information it receives everyday."'' s He has requested additional analysts to
track threats and ensure that individuals of concern are placed on appropriate
airline watch-lists. 59 Yet the NCTC Director also claimed: "I do not [have], nor
do I believe the DNI as currently constructed has, all of the authorities to move
all of the information in a way that will maximize the likelihood of detecting
these plots. " 6 ' He presumably was referring to the NCTC's aforementioned
ambiguous IRTPA authorities, which appear to allow the Center to identify but
not direct operations.6'
Yet it also is worth emphasizing the NCTC's instrumental role in disrupting
the 2006 transatlantic airline plot as well as identifying Najibullah Zazi and
David Headley, the recently arrested al-Qaeda affiliates in the United States.
The Center has been able to detect and disrupt a number of plots with a nexus
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. The challenge is to develop that
capability in other potential al-Qaeda havens around the world (e.g., Yemen,
North Africa, and Somalia) without detracting from ongoing counterterrorism
efforts that have proven successful.
CONCLUSION
On December 25, 2009, President Obama received rather unsettling
exposure to the challenges confronting the U.S. intelligence community. The
May 2010 attempted bombing in New York's Times Square emphasized the
severity of the terrorist threat and the intelligence community's struggle to
detect and disrupt these plots. Yet the President, like the rest of the United
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States, was fortunate that neither of these terrorist attacks succeeded. With the
resignation of DNI Blair and the nomination of former Lieutenant General
James Clapper to be the next DNI, the Obama Administration now has an
opportunity to take ownership of the counterterrorism struggle and further
strengthen the intelligence community's capabilities. This is no easy feat. A brief
review of the recent history of intelligence reform reveals the troubling
circumstances under which the DNI position was created and the inherent
weaknesses in the IRTPA that have led to bureaucratic squabbles ever since. The
IRTPA clearly could have been drafted more carefully, but, through sustained
White House leadership and support for the DNI, many of the intelligence
coordination mechanisms gradually have come into place. Sustained
presidential commitment always has been essential to effective intelligence
reform, and it is even more necessary today. Sustained congressional support is
equally necessary. The ODNI is not well-served by a Congress that is quick to
criticize and score political points when mistakes are made but unwilling-once
the cameras turn away-to provide the robust and stable funding needed to
accomplish the intelligence reform mission.
The Obama Administration must emphasize that the intelligence
community cannot return to a pre-IRTPA world. Despite all of the IRTPA's
imperfections, the intelligence community still is adjusting to a new
organizational system and simply cannot survive another reorganization or de-
organization, whichever the case may be. Although there certainly have been
serious recent mistakes, the NCTC has persevered in the face of adversity and
demonstrated its ability to coordinate counterterrorism intelligence efforts.
Recognition within the intelligence community that the ODNI and the NCTC
are here to stay, and that their authority will not be undermined depending on
the issue of the moment, can afford the DNI opportunity to tackle the tough
long-term issues in intelligence reform.
To this end, the intelligence community needs to be run by nonpolitical,
career professionals. President Obama apparently shares these aspirations, given
the 2008 campaign proposal to create a fixed term for the DNI similar to the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Despite the
questionable decision to replace the DNI and the DCIA upon assuming office,
President Obama's campaign pledge recognized that organizational stability can
foster a collaborative, nonpartisan atmosphere and acceptance of the DNI's
authorities. Intelligence is a complex, dangerous business that only functions
effectively in secrecy, out of the public eye. The President, his Cabinet, and our
nation's warfighters need an intelligence service that stays out of the front-page
headlines, delivers unbiased and confidential analysis, and engages in risky but
necessary activities abroad. The Obama Administration should revisit this
campaign proposal and work with Congress to explore legislative corrections
that promote leadership continuity in the intelligence community.
An analysis of potential legislative remedies indicates that the Director of
the FBI position is a more sensible model for DNI leadership than the Federal
Reserve Chairman. As established by Congress, the Federal Reserve Chairman is
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve a fixed four-
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year term that does not coincide with the President's own four-year term of
office."' The fixed term helps foster a degree of independence from the White
House. Although the President may remove the Federal Reserve Chairman with
a showing of cause,'6 3 scholars have observed that refusal to obey a presidential
directive has not been interpreted as sufficient "cause" to warrant removal. 16 4 A
four-year term, however, may not be long enough to help solidify the nascent
DNI leadership structure. Moreover, intelligence operations are often
dangerous and so politically sensitive that a President requires more
accountability from the intelligence community than the near-complete
independence that the Federal Reserve Chairman enjoys. Furthermore, any
legislative attempt to extend the term of the DNI also must apply to the DCIA,
since it would undermine the DNI's leadership of the intelligence community if
the President had greater flexibility in choosing the DCIA and thus developed a
stronger relationship with an individual technically subordinate to the DNI.
With the creation of the ODNI in the wake of the 9/11 and Iraq WMD
intelligence failures, the challenges confronting the intelligence community
today are reminiscent of those that the FBI encountered following the
allegations of politicization and misconduct revealed by the Church Committee
during the Watergate affair. To enhance the FBI's legitimacy and independence,
in 1976 Congress limited the FBI Director position to a ten-year term,165 and
since then the job has gone to nonpartisan, career law enforcement officials.
The FBI Director thus enjoys an extended term limit, as opposed to the Federal
Reserve Chairman's fixed term. There is no statutory limit on the power of the
President to remove the FBI Director before the end of the ten-year period, but
in practice the President is constrained since the successor requires Senate
confirmation. However, the President maintains far greater control over the FBI
Director than the Federal Reserve Chairman, and most FBI Directors do not
serve the full ten years. The intelligence community would benefit greatly from
a similar type of leadership continuity. We recommend that President Obama
work with Congress to create similar ten-year appointments for the positions of
DNI and DCIA.
Yet we also must avoid overcompensating for the failures of the past. Since
9/11, the intelligence community has suffered from a narrow-minded focus on
correcting previous mistakes without considering future threats lurking on the
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horizon. The intelligence community cannot afford to concentrate
counterterrorism resources in Yemen, only to let al-Qaeda regroup in Pakistan
or in an ungoverned space. Nor can the intelligence community organize itself
solely around the counterterrorism mission without devoting sufficient
resources to the full array of global challenges, including WMD proliferation
and the threats posed by traditional state actors.
Finally, we must recognize not just the potential of intelligence reform but
also its limitations. People and technology are far more important than
bureaucratic policies and plans. The intelligence community can and must
perform better to help protect the United States, but it never will protect the
country completely from strategic surprise. Its analysts and collectors will make
mistakes, its organizational systems and procedures will break down, and its
leaders occasionally will say and do the wrong things. When that happens-and
it will-nonpartisan, professional leadership of the intelligence community
becomes even more critical. A realistic knowledge of the intelligence
community's capabilities is essential to achieving the best results. With strong
leaders at the top who respect each other and with the most effective
collaborative tools at the fingertips of their subordinates, the men and women
who comprise the intelligence community are capable of disrupting terrorist
plots and communicating critical analyses to policymakers. The American
people expect and deserve nothing less.

